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 In “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems,” Linda Zagzebski claims that 
every theory of knowledge that does not raise the standard for justification 
problematically high, so as to rule out a tremendous proportion of beliefs we 
typically take to be justified, will inevitably face Gettier-type problems. That is 
because, she claims, Gettier problems arise from the gap of independence 
between truth and justification.  In this paper, I defend and strengthen Alvin 
Plantinga’s proper function theory of knowledge against an alleged Gettier case 
that Zagzebski provides by exploring the relationship between two specific 
components of his theory.  Next, I consider a final objection to the reinforced 
framework of the proper function theory.  I end with a dilemma that faces the 
proper functionalist and conclude that it is possible for the theory to achieve 
immunity to Gettier problems. 
First, I will provide an overview of Plantinga’s proper function theory.  It 
defines knowledge as warranted true belief, where “warrant” encompasses a 
number of epistemically valuable states of affairs: 
 
A belief B has warrant for S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments 
involved in the production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive 
environment sufficiently similar to that for which S’s faculties are designed; and 
the modules of the design plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at 
truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in 
accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true...”1 
 
Warrant, then, involves a number of factors: proper functioning of relevant 
faculties; a proper cognitive environment; a truth-aimed design plan; and 
reliability.  To gain a better understanding of these terms, let’s take a look at a few 
attempted counter-examples that Plantinga discusses and why he believes they are 
unsuccessful. 
 First is one devised by Carl Ginet.2  In driving through the Wisconsin 
countryside, you see a barn off the side of the road and form the belief that there 
is a barn there.  Unbeknownst to you, the local inhabitants have constructed a 
massive number of fake barn façades, indistinguishable from real barns, which 
constitute 75% of the apparent barns in the area.  At first glance, then, you have a 
warranted true belief that is not knowledge.  However, as Plantinga explains, your 
belief is not actually warranted.  Our faculties are not designed to operate in a 
cognitive environment (CE) in which our evidence is manipulated to intentionally 
induce false beliefs, and so the CE condition of warrant is not met. 
 The reader may now be wondering about the term cognitive environment, 
particularly what it is that differentiates a cognitive environment from an 
                                                        
1
 Plantinga, Alvin, Warrant and Proper Function, New York (Oxford UP, 1993), 19. 
2
 Ibid., 33. 
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 environment simpliciter.  Although Plantinga never explicitly defines the term, it 
is clear that he intends for it to encompass a broad spectrum of one’s physical 
environment, including, for example, other people and physical objects.3  From 
his application of the term, I take it that one’s cognitive environment consists of 
all factors external to an agent’s own mind that influence the formation of a 
particular belief, including those that influence the reliability of the belief-forming 
process being used.  As reliability is presumably determined modally (i.e. by the 
proportion of nearby possible worlds in which the belief-forming process yields a 
true belief), the relevant factors of CE will include more than just what influences 
the belief-forming process in the actual world.  In this sense, the composition of 
the gasses in the air, noise level, lighting, and presence of barn façades can all be 
considered part of one’s cognitive environment. 
 Take the classic Gettier example of a clock that just happened to stop 
running exactly twenty-four hours before you look at it.  By looking at the clock, 
you form a true belief through properly functioning faculties in a non-
manipulative environment, in accordance with a design plan aimed at truth.  
While it appears that this is a case of warranted true belief that is not knowledge, 
Plantinga contends that the belief in question is not warranted.  Once again, there 
is a glitch in the cognitive environment.  Our design plan does not intend for our 
faculties to operate in an environment in which belief-forming tools (such as 
clocks) are malfunctioning.4  Once again, a glitch in CE prevents the belief from 
being warranted. 
Finally, let’s consider Zagzebski’s example. It goes as follows: Mary, who 
has good vision, has seen and identified her husband sitting in his chair numerous 
times in the past.  One night, unbeknownst to her, her husband’s brother is 
visiting and sitting in her husband’s chair.  As they look sufficiently similar, she 
mistakes her brother-in-law for her husband, and so forms the belief that her 
husband is sitting in the living room.  Her husband, coincidentally, is in fact 
sitting in the living room, just out of her view.  Mary, then, has formed a 
warranted, true belief based on faculties functioning properly in an appropriate 
environment but does not have knowledge.  Therefore, Plantinga’s account does 
not avoid Gettier cases. 
 It seems to me, however, that Zagzebski has overlooked relevant parts of 
Plantinga’s theory.  First, she assumes that because “no one is dressing up as her 
husband to fool her,” (208) Mary’s environment is “appropriate.”  However, this 
is not a sufficient condition for an appropriate CE.  Rather, for CE to be 
                                                        
3
 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 33-35. 
4
 It might be easier to view such malfunctioning tools in light of the proper functioning condition 
instead of the favorable environment condition—that is, our faculties and the tools we use to form 
beliefs must be operating according to a reliable design plan aimed at truth.  However, Plantinga 
does not so qualify proper functioning, so I will leave the thought here. 
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 considered proper, it must be more than non-deceptive.  But what other conditions 
must be met?  Conveniently enough, Plantinga addresses a very similar case in the 
final volume of his warrant on trilogy.  In his example, you glance across the 
street and see Paul, your neighbor, through his window.   However, you are 
unaware that Paul’s identical twin Peter happens to be visiting and is in the next 
room over, hidden from view.  While you have what appears to be a warranted 
true belief, it just so happens to be true by chance, and thus you have a Gettier 
case for Plantinga’s theory. 
 Once more, Plantinga credits the error to a glitch in the cognitive 
environment, though he gives a more specific account of it here.  He first specifies 
that a cognitive environment is sufficiently warrant-yielding if it is favorable for 
the specific exercise of cognitive powers (E) used in producing the belief in 
question (B).5  He refers to this specified environment as MBE (a cognitive 
environment with respect to B and E).  More significantly, he provides the 
following definition of favorability, which I will call (F): 
 
MBE is favorable just if there is no state of affairs S included in MBE but not in 
DMBE [the conjunction of circumstances in MBE that are detectable by E] such 
that the objective probability of B with respect to the conjunction of DMBE and S 
falls below [a reasonably high objective probability].6 
 
In other words, a favorable environment is one in which there are no factors that 
are undetectable to the belief-forming process used that, if known, would remove 
the believer’s warrant for the belief being formed. 
 Note first that this clearly solves the problem with the cases of Mary and 
Peter and Paul.  In each example, there is some evidence (namely, the presence of 
the person outside of view) not accessible to E (looking across the street, or into 
the living room) that, if made known to the agent, would render her belief 
unwarranted.  According to (F) then, MBE in these circumstances is not 
favorable, and so the beliefs are not warranted. 
 Unfortunately, (F) introduces problems of its own.  It is at heart a 
defeasibility requirement (a counterfactual amendment that restricts warrant to 
cases in which, if given access to all relevant evidence, the agent would continue 
to hold the belief in question).  Zagzebski critiques such requirements in her 
article (successfully, in my assessment), and Plantinga’s theory falls victim to the 
same concerns.  The objection is that such stipulations link justification (or 
warrant) too closely with truth, and so render a great number of beliefs we 
                                                        
5
 It is important to see that we cannot assess the favorability an environment without considering it 
in relation to the particular exercise of cognitive powers (E) and the belief being formed (B), as 
this will become crucial later on.  
6
 Plantinga, Alvin, Warranted Christian Belief, New York (Oxford UP, 2000), 159-60. 
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 typically take to be warranted unwarranted.  Since, for practically any false belief, 
there will be some evidence of its falsehood undetected by the agent that, if 
known, would render that belief unwarranted, (F) makes truth a near prerequisite 
for warrant.  This addition does not escape Zagzebski’s attack and is not a 
satisfactory response.7 
 Is there a better defense one can afford Plantinga?  I believe so.  We need 
to push deeper into the notion of a favorable CE.   Recall that one of Plantinga’s 
criteria for warrant is that a belief be formed by faculties “functioning properly in 
a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which S’s faculties are 
designed.”8  While some conditions for a favorable environment seem to be all-
or-nothing, others clearly admit of degrees—that is, certain environmental factors 
provide a range for a number of favorable environments.  I believe it is this latter 
sort that concerns the examples we are considering, and so will now turn to 
consider it. 
 First, take an example.  Suppose you are forming a belief as to whether or 
not your grandmother is in the dining room at her retirement center.  Standing 
outside the dining room, you see a single walker along the wall and recognize it to 
be of the same unique color and style of your grandmother’s.  You thereby form 
the belief that your grandmother is in the dining room.  Grant that CE is about as 
appropriate as it could be; the lighting is excellent, your field of view unobscured, 
no geriatric prankster is trying to play a joke on you, etc.  Further, assume that all 
other warrant-criteria are met: your faculties are functioning properly according to 
a design plan successfully aimed at truth, and that such a belief formed under 
these conditions is highly likely to be true.  We have, then, a situation in which 
your belief is warranted in a highly favorable environment. 
Now, keeping all other factors constant, imagine a revision to the 
environment.  The manager of the retirement center was so impressed with your 
grandmother’s sense of style that he recently bought every resident a new walker 
identical in color and model to your grandmother’s.  Following the same process 
as before, your belief that your grandmother is in the dining room is not 
warranted.  Presumably, this is because your faculties are not designed to identify 
a particular object in an environment in which there are a large number of objects 
identical (or nearly identical) to it.  Your environment is no longer favorable. 
Imagine one final change in the scenario.  Although all the residents of the 
center now have identical walkers, due to a rather unfortunate but minor collision 
your grandmother’s has a very specific pattern of scratches on one side of it (these 
scratches exist unnoticed in the previous example).  In forming your belief that 
your grandmother is in the dining hall, you notice this specific pattern of scratches 
                                                        
7
 It is worth noting that Plantinga himself showed reservations about (F), though not exactly for 
the reasons specified here; WCB 160-161. 
8
 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 19. 
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 on the walker against the wall.  Although CE is no more favorable in the case in 
which you notice the scratches than in the case in which you do not, your belief is 
warranted.  Here, then, we have a situation in which your belief is warranted in a 
significantly less favorable environment than the first. 
If my assessment of the above three examples is correct, then we have a 
range of cognitive environments in which a particular belief can be warranted.  
What is it that accounts for this range?  It is the same thing that differentiates the 
second and third cases.  Recall the previous mention of MBE.  In order to see 
whether or not CE is favorable, we must first contextualize it with respect to B 
and E. B provides us with the end for which we are assessing favorability (are we 
looking to see if your grandmother is in the dining hall, or if the dining hall is 
open?), while E provides us with the method (a poorly lit room may be 
unfavorable to visual assessment, but pose no inhibitions to a tactile one).  E, B, 
and CE are inextricably tied together in MBE, and it is only in MBE that 
favorability can be properly assessed. 
In particular, the connection between E and CE concerns us here. As it is 
only for the conjunction of E and CE that favorability can be determined, a 
change in one can compensate for an opposite change in the other.  This explains 
how the first and third scenarios above can both yield warranted beliefs while the 
favorability of CE shifts significantly. Your specific exercise of visual assessment 
E is much more precise in case three, with respect to the relevant evidence, than 
in case one.  Thus, you are still able to have a warranted belief when the 
favorability of CE with respect to visual assessment declines.  More significantly, 
this explains how the same belief being formed in the same cognitive environment 
by the same person has the potential to be either warranted or unwarranted.  The 
more reliable E is, the less favorable CE must be, and vice versa. 
One may be tempted to make a generality objection here.  The classic 
objection to reliablism preys on the ambiguity of “belief-forming process.”  Does 
it include only internal faculties, or external tools and the environment as well?  
What determines which factors are relevant or not? If one defines the term 
narrowly enough, a belief-forming process could be so specifically indexed (to a 
time, a place, persons, etc.) as to only have a few possible instantiations.  If one 
defines it too broadly, a single belief-forming process may encompass a number 
of unrelated instances.  Either way, the reliability of any given process will 
depend heavily on this definition.  Similarly, Plantinga must provide a 
satisfactory, non-arbitrary definition of E if his theory is not to fall prey to the 
same objection. 
Such a generality objection does not apply to the proper function theory, 
however, as Plantinga has already adequately defined E.  Recall that E is not 
defined as a belief-forming process, but much more narrowly as a specific 
exercise of cognitive faculties.  The relevant E for any given belief-formation, 
5
Woods: Clarifying the Gettier Objection
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014
 then, will be the type of faculties engaged, without reference to external 
conditions.  E is just those cognitive faculties that are actually engaged in forming 
the belief in question.  Further, reliability on Plantinga’s theory is based on the 
conjunction of E and CE in reference to a specific belief (MBE).  By specifically 
indexing reliability to the particular conditions for the formation of a particular 
belief, this theory avoids the ambiguity that typically plagues reliablist theories. 
As such, it does not succumb to generality objections. 
I will clarify the notion of MBE with reference to Michael Strevens’ 
approach to causal explanation.9  In advocating for what he calls the kairetic 
account of causation, he uses the image of a brick breaking a window to explain 
how interdependent factors can be involved in causation: 
 
Suppose that I wish to explain the breaking of a window. As it happens, I threw a 
rather heavy brick at the window. Question: did the mass of the brick make a 
difference to the fact of the window’s breaking? Answer: if you mean, did the 
exact mass of the brick make a difference, then no. The brick weighed 2 kg, but 
had it weighed 1 kg or 3 kg, the window would have broken just the same.10 
 
This is analogous to the role of either E or CE.  The exact favorability of one 
variable does not make or break whether or not a belief is warranted.  Strevens 
continues:  
 
Assume that, in order to entail that the window breaks, a veridical causal model 
of the breaking must entail that the brick has a momentum of at least 3 kgms and 
no more than 20 kgms. Now suppose that a model M specifies that the brick has 
a mass between 1 kg and 5 kg. If M is to entail that the window breaks, it must 
limit the velocity of the brick to between 3ms and 4ms in order to guarantee that 
the brick’s momentum falls within the required range. (The brick’s momentum is 
the product of its mass and velocity.) Another veridical model, which stipulates a 
narrower range for the brick’s mass—say, between 2 kg and 4 kg—can stipulate 
a wider range for the velocity... There is one way to describe the mass m and the 
velocity v of the brick so that the resulting model is veridical, entails the window 
breaking, and generates the models described above and any other competitors:  
3 ≤ mv ≤ 20 
A model incorporating this description, then, is the most abstract veridical, 
deterministic causal model for the window breaking...11 
 
I believe this formula transfers well into Plantinga’s theory.  MBE is analogous to 
the brick’s momentum, and its yielding warrant to the window breaking, while 
                                                        
9
 Strevens, Michael, The causal and unification approaches to explanation unified—causally, 
Noûs 38 (1):154–176. 
10
 Ibid., 167. 
11
 Ibid.,168-9. 
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 mass and velocity are the equivalent of E and CE.  When one of these values (or 
ranges) is specified, it restricts the value or range of the other.12  Our formula for 
this part of the warrant equation (that dealing with CE and reliability), then, is 
something like the following: 
 r ≤ fMBE, 
where r is a sufficiently high probability of a belief being true, and fMBE is the 
favorability of MBE, seen as a specific conjunction of E, B, and CE. 
 Admittedly, there is a significant difference between Strevens’ original 
formulation and the one I provided above.  While the mass and velocity of a brick 
are specific and quantifiable values, the favorability of E and CE (fE and fCE 
respectively) cannot properly be understood to hold values independent of each 
other.  I do not think this speaks against my application, however.  Instead of 
fMBE being the product of specific values, we can understand E and CE as 
holding independent potentialities for favorability—that is, for a specified E, it 
can be said how reliable the method is in any given environment, and vice versa 
for CE.  Even if these potentialities are not quantifiable and we are thereby unable 
to precisely calculate fMBE, we can still claim that they in fact determine its 
value as well as the precision of the other value needed for warrant. 
 I need to say more about E’s role in this theory.  First, I will refer to the 
favorability of E being its potential to yield a true belief without a specified CE, 
as explained above.  Further, the type of faculties involved in E establishes the 
degrees of favorability with respect to fE.  In other words, the faculties used in 
forming the belief (i.e. vision/sense perception, memory, etc.) determine how fE 
can move along the scale.  In the retirement center example, using your sense of 
sight determines what it takes to improve or worsen fE: glancing at the walker on 
the wall would yield a lower value for fE than looking closely (and in doing so 
noticing the unique scratches on her walker).  A better assessment of the situation 
can thus compensate for a less favorable environment. 
 I anticipate a vagueness objection here.  Not only is it difficult (perhaps 
even impossible) to non-arbitrarily quantify the favorability of CE or E, but we 
must also quantify r to yield a functional formula. Unfortunately, I have no 
response here.  Plantinga himself admits that his theory suffers from vagueness, 
and that problem carries over to the current argument.  It is an admitted weakness, 
and not one that is within the scope of this paper to attempt to solve. 
 Now, let’s consider the implications of the current theory on the Mary and 
Peter/Paul cases.  For Mary, it seems that when her husband is alone in the living 
room, fCE is rather high, and so fE can be relatively low for MBE to be sufficient 
for warrant—she only need glance briefly to be warranted in her belief that he is 
in the living room.  When her brother-in-law is visiting, however, fCE drops, and 
                                                        
12
 One notable disanalogy is that in relation to Plantinga’s theory, we won’t expect to have an 
upper bound (other than the conjunction of an ideal CE and E). 
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 so fE must rise to compensate.  She may, for example, need to look longer or 
move closer to her brother-in-law in order to sufficiently raise MBE.  However, in 
doing so, she would recognize him to not be her husband.  Similarly, if your 
neighbor’s identical twin is visiting, CE is very unfavorable for forming the belief 
that Paul is home, and so it may not even be possible to achieve warrant by 
looking from across the street.  In neither case, then, is the agent’s belief 
warranted, and so both fail as Gettier problems. 
 I believe that what I provided above is the strongest defense that can be 
provided for Plantinga’s theory against Gettier cases, and it certainly defeats 
Zagzebski’s example in her paper.  However, there is still a response that 
Plantinga’s opponent can give.  What the above framework does is explain how 
Gettier situations lower the favorability of one’s environment and so remove the 
warrant one would normally have for a belief (unless the subject compensates 
with a sufficiently precise exercise of cognitive faculties).  What the critic will 
rightly point out is that this does not preclude the possibility of Gettier problems.  
All a Gettier environment does is raise the bar for justification.  As long as it is 
possible for an agent to meet this heightened requirement but still be mistaken-in 
other words, to have an accidentally true warranted belief in a Gettier 
environment-then a Gettier case can be devised. 
 Can Plantinga’s theory escape a second time?  I see one response he can 
give, and it is not an entirely satisfying one.  If he is to avoid allowing Gettier 
cases, Plantinga must deny that it is possible for someone to have an accidentally 
true warranted belief in a Gettier environment.  This would mean that acquiring 
warrant in such an environment requires the (non-accidental) truth of the belief in 
question.  One concern here is that, prima facie, it seems to run right into the 
second horn of Zagzebski’s original dilemma: it links warrant too closely with 
truth.  However, my defense demonstrates how the proper function theory only 
links warrant this closely in extremely unfavorable cognitive environments such 
as those seen in Gettier cases.  In typical belief-forming processes where fCE is 
not so low, the theory does not require such a strong connection with truth, and so 
it avoids the unpalatable consequences that defeasibility requirements and 
counterfactual conditions have on justification.  In other words, it is a much 
smaller bullet to bite. 
 A further concern is that the above claim commits the No True Scotsman 
fallacy.  One might contend that there is no good reason why a Gettier 
environment should require truth for warrant instead of just a very high degree of 
precision; Plantinga just adds an ad hoc addendum to his criteria for warrant that 
says “... and B is not formed in a Gettier environment (unless it’s non-accidentally 
true!).”  Unfortunately, I do not believe there is anything Plantinga can do here 
except dig in his heels.  Getter environments are unfavorable to such a degree that 
fMBE cannot be sufficient for warrant unless E is precise enough to guarantee the 
8
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 non-accidental truth of B.  Unfortunately, the general vagueness of fCE, fE, and 
fMBE prohibits us from verifying this move with specific numbers.  Nonetheless, 
it is the move Plantinga must make.  When her brother-in-law is in the room, 
Mary must assess the environment well enough that she cannot be mistaken about 
the identity of the man in her husband’s chair.  In driving through fake-barn 
country, you cannot be warranted in believing any apparent barn is in fact a barn 
unless E is precise enough to guarantee that you would distinguish between a real 
barn and a façade.  In short, given Plantinga’s original criterion of a proper 
cognitive environment, the nature of the Gettier environment just does make non-
accidental truth a prerequisite for warrant. 
 At this point, the defender of the proper function theory is left with a 
dilemma: either she adopts the above account of warrant in Gettier cases, or she 
admits that Gettier problems can be devised for her theory.  While I suspect the 
former option to prove more undesirable than the latter, I will leave this for her to 
decide.  Nonetheless, I have shown how a proper understanding of MBE, the joint 
relationship of one’s cognitive environment and exercise of cognitive faculties, 
defeats Zagzebski’s initial Gettier scenario, and I have clarified and strengthened 
Plantinga’s theory against other potential objections.  Although the proper 
function theorist may be in the best position to escape Gettier problems, she is not  
able to do so without cost. 
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